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Abstract 
 
This study uses data on 27 European stock indices over the period from January 2007 to 
December 2012 to investigate the relationship between innovations and the market reaction to 
negative news during the financial crisis. We use the bivariate BEKK-GARCH approach to 
estimate time-varying betas and abnormal returns. We show that index prices of countries in 
the high (low) innovation groups experience significantly positive (negative) abnormal 
returns on and following the negative news announcement dates. We also find that index beta 
changes following the arrival of bad news is negatively associated with a country’s 
innovativeness. This finding suggests that innovations promote economic stability and 
enhance investors’ confidence in a country’s ability to cope during difficult times. Thus, 
policy makers who are concerned with sustainable growth should encourage R&D 
investments by adopting effective policies and avoid unnecessary cuts in R&D expenditures 
even during times of crisis. A study of the pre-crisis period from January 2001 to December 
2006, using the same methods, indicates that investors value innovation more during difficult 
times. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A recent OECD (2009) report suggests that the recession, which began with the financial 
crisis of 2007, has impacted research and development (R&D) in OECD countries. In the 
fourth quarter of 2008, a decline in R&D expenditure, or at best slower growth, was apparent. 
Moreover, R&D expenditure declined by a record 4.5% in 2009 across the OECD, with falls 
in all major OECD countries except South Korea and France. However, as is shown in this 
paper, the performance of stock markets in OECD countries during the crisis period has 
exhibited heterogeneity. The study reported in this paper sheds light on the role of innovation 
in building investor confidence and in stimulating economic recovery. The argument that 
motivates this work is that if innovation improves profitability and reduces investment costs, 
it should also increase investors’ confidence in a country’s ability to withstand the effect of 
difficult economic conditions. More specifically, if investors’ confidence increases with 
innovation, the stock markets of innovation-intensive countries would be less adversely 
affected by negative news about the global economy. We investigate this issue by examining 
the reaction of European stock market indices to the arrival of major negative news during 
the recent global financial crisis. We choose to focus our analysis on European markets for 
several reasons. First, Europe is a significant player in the global economy, with the GDP of 
the euro-zone area ($13 trillion) being almost equal to that of the US ($15 trillion). Secondly, 
whilst the financial crisis started in the US, its impact was greater and it lasted longer in 
Europe (Weisbrot, 2014). Thirdly, the European sovereign debt crisis had a significant effect 
on investors’ confidence and was blamed for the slow recovery in the US and the global 
economy. Finally, the considerable variations in European countries’ commitments to 
innovations and the fact that these countries are not affected in the same way by the financial 
crisis make Europe a perfect environment to study the link between innovation and a county’s 
ability to cope during difficult times.   
 
This paper is motivated both by theoretical literature and empirical evidence at firm 
and country level. Chen and Zhang (2009) develop a model in which firms with higher 
expected profitability and lower investment costs provide higher expected returns. To test 
whether the market rewards innovation, existing empirical studies focus almost exclusively 
on the impact of R&D investments and patents on firm value (see for example Griliches, 
1981; Jaffe, 1986; Hall et al, 2005), the short-term stock price reaction to R&D 
announcements (for example Chan et al, 1990; Saad and Zantout, 2009) and the long-term 
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stock returns associated with past R&D investment (for example Chan et al, 2001; Eberhart 
et al, 2004). However, the results of these studies are far from conclusive. For example, Chan 
et al (2001) find firms with higher R&D investment experience no better long-term risk-
adjusted excess returns than the rest of their sample firms. However, Porter (1992), Hall 
(1993) and Hall and Hall (1993) show that investors fail to foresee the rewards from long-
term R&D investments and thus undervalue R&D-intensive stocks. Eberhart et al (2004) 
show that firms exhibit significant positive risk-adjusted excess returns for the five-year 
period following R&D expenditure increases. They interpret it as an evidence of investors’ 
under reaction to the benefit of R&D increases.  
 
While several studies show that innovations stimulate economic growth (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Solow, 1956) and promote nations’ competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1998), evidence on the relationship between innovations and aggregate 
stock market returns is relatively scarce. Hsu (2009) argues that if innovation raises the 
expected productivity and profitability of the representative firm, it should also improve the 
overall efficiency and reduce investment costs at the aggregate level. Consistent with this 
prediction, Hsu finds that innovations have positive and distinct predictive power for U.S. 
and other countries market returns and premiums. The study in this paper also uses country 
level data to investigate the relationship between innovation and market returns and 
premiums. However, unlike Hsu (2009), who attempts to explain the time series of market 
returns using innovation shocks, we investigate the behaviour of market returns and betas 
following the arrival of negative news about the global economy. This leads to new insights 
about the relationship between innovation and investor confidence in a country’s ability to 
cope during difficult economic climates. We argue that the productivity and efficiency 
benefits associated with innovations are likely to be even more crucial during crisis periods, 
particularly as customers switch to lower-priced products/services providers in order to 
reduce their expenditure.  
 
This argument suggests that firms and economies with continued investments in 
innovations are more likely to survive the recession and position themselves well for the 
recovery periods, whereas others may be forced to cut their R&D expenditure to ensure short-
term survival at the expense of the long-term performance (see, for example, Smallbone et al, 
1999). Thus, if innovations help firms to respond properly in times of trouble, investors might 
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be less worried about losing their wealth in times of trouble and may therefore react less 
adversely, or even positively, to the arrival of negative news about the global economy.  
 
To investigate this issue, we estimate abnormal returns and time-varying betas for 27 
European country indices around informed negative shocks. These which are defined as the 
World index returns in the lowest 5th percentile that can be matched with the timelines of the 
crisis released by the BBC, European Central Bank (ECB), Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
and The Guardian1 newspaper. We argue that if innovations enhance investors’ confidence, 
one would expect a positive association between innovation measures and event day 
abnormal returns, as recessions may have less adverse effect on the competitiveness and 
profitability of firms in innovation-intensive economies. We also examine the effect of 
innovation on the co-movement of local stock market indices and the World index during 
crisis periods. As above, it can be argued that the stability of economies with continuous 
investments innovations is less likely to be threatened by recession, as firms in these markets 
are better equipped to cope with the challenges imposed by global economic downturns. Thus, 
negative news about the global economy should have less impact on the time varying betas, 
which are a measure of stability and riskiness, of stock markets of highly innovative countries.  
 
Taking into account different levels of innovation, we provide a direct comparison for 
27 European markets. The innovation measures are based on government budget 
appropriations or outlays on research and development as a percentage of GDP, the actual 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, the ratio of knowledge based researchers to total 
employment and the number of patent applications per million inhabitants. The 27 countries 
are split into high (30%), medium (40%) and low (30%) innovation groups. Consistent with 
the investor confidence view, we show that countries with higher innovation measures 
experience much smaller negative stock price reactions to negative news events. The results 
also suggest that abnormal returns around days of informed negative shocks are positively 
related to the cross-country variation in innovation variables. The results are robust to 
different measures of innovation and after controlling for the effects of other economic 
                                                          
1
 See the following links for further details: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/07/credit-crunch-boom-bust-timeline, 
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline, and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580 
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variables. We also show that changes in stock market index betas tend to exhibit a negative 
association with a country’s innovativeness. This relationship is particularly pronounced 
when government support to R&D activities is used to measure innovation. We attribute the 
observed decline in the co-movement between innovation-intensive stock indices with the 
World index to the superior performance of highly innovative firms during global downturns.  
 
To investigate whether these findings are unique to the crisis period, the analysis is 
also carried out for the period January 2001 to December 2006. We find that the positive 
reaction of innovation-intensive country indices to the arrival of negative news is unique to 
the times of crisis. This finding indicates that investors value innovation more during difficult 
times.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents a brief description of the global 
financial crisis and its impact on the European countries. Section 4 presents the data, defines 
the variables and reports the descriptive statistics. Section 5 describes the methodology. 
Section 6 reports the empirical results and Section 7 discusses the implications of our 
findings and concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
Several studies, including Stein (1988), Porter (1992) and Hall (1993), argue that investors 
focus excessively on short-term profits and under-value firms with long-term investments, 
such as R&D, which create strategic options for a firm and are a major source of competitive 
advantage (see, for example, Ansoff, 1995; Porter, 1998). However, Jensen (1993) argues 
that not all R&D investments are likely to be profitable. If investors overlook this possibility, 
they are more likely to overvalue the stocks of R&D-intensive firms. Several studies 
investigate the issue of whether R&D intensive stocks are over- or under-valued by 
examining the stock price behaviour following the announcement of corporate R&D 
investments.  
 
One stream of the empirical literature focuses on the short-term stock price reaction to 
R&D expenditure announcements. Chan et al (1990) and Zantout and Tsetsekos (1994) show 
that stock markets react positively to increased R&D expenditure announcements by 
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technology firms. Saad and Zantout (2009) find a negative stock price response to public 
announcements on discontinuation of R&D programs in science and technology industries. 
Szewczyk et al (1996) report a positive association between Tobin's q, a measure of 
investment opportunities, and stock price reaction to the announcement of R&D investments. 
Using a sample of 157 US firms for the period 1968-1974, Griliches (1981) finds that one 
additional dollar spent on R&D boosts a firm’s market value by $2 and an additional patent 
boosts the market value by around $200,000 over the long term. Hall et al (2005) show that 
the book value of assets, number of patents per dollar of R&D and number of citations per 
patent have significant impacts on market value, with an extra citation per patent enhancing a 
firm’s market value by about 3%. Ehie and Olibe (2010) report a positive association 
between R&D investments and market value for both manufacturing and services industries.  
 
While the majority of studies report a positive short-term price reaction to increased 
R&D expenditure announcements, others show that the market reaction to R&D investments 
varies considerably across time and regions. For example, Hall (1993) reports a sharper 
decrease in the market valuation of R&D investment in the US manufacturing industry during 
1986 – 1991 than that observed during 1979 – 1983. She attributes such a decline to a lower 
rate of return to R&D and a higher discount rate for R&D investments due to uncertainty. 
Erickson and Jacobson (1992) find that R&D investments do not increase the market value of 
US firms, after taking into consideration other firm-specific factors. Hall and Oriani (2006) 
find that R&D is valued by French and German investors, but not by Italian ones. Booth et al 
(2006) and Karjalainen (2008) find that investors better value R&D expenditures in a market-
based financial system than those in a bank-based financial system.   
 
Another stream of empirical studies focuses on the long-term performance of firms 
with different R&D investments. Pakes (1985) uses a sample of 120 US firms over the period 
1968-1975 to investigate the dynamics among patents (measured by the number of successful 
patent applications), R&D expenditures and stock returns. He finds that the events that lead 
the market to re-valuate the firm are significantly correlated with unpredictable changes in 
both R&D and the patents of the firm. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the R&D variable, defined as the weighted sum of past R&D 
expenses, in cross-sectional stock returns over the 12 months subsequent to the release of 
current period accounting information. Eberhart et al (2004) find that US firms with 
unexpected R&D increases experience significantly positive risk-adjusted excess stock 
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returns for 5 years following the firm’s R&D increase. They argue that investors 
systematically underreact to R&D increases that are considered as long-term beneficial 
investments. Similarly, Eberhart et al (2004) show all groups of firms benefit from R&D 
investments, but R&D expenditures of high-tech firms generate significantly higher abnormal 
returns than low-tech firms. Their evidence suggests that the market is slow to recognise the 
full benefit of R&D investments and the delay in incorporating the R&D benefits is greater in 
the case of high-tech firms. In contrast, Chan et al (2001) do not find any significant 
difference in average risk-adjusted excess return between US firms with and without R&D 
investments.  
 
While research on the effectiveness of R&D investments is evident, little attention has 
been given the impact of innovations, the by-products of R&D investments, on firms’ ability 
to cope during difficult times. This study uses country level data to investigate the 
relationship between a country’s innovativeness and its stock index price reaction to the 
announcement of major bad news about the global economy. The efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) suggests that stock price should reflect all relevant information immediately and 
accurately. Thus, stock prices are expected to decrease on the days when negative news 
arrives to the market. However, we argue that the extent of stock market index price reaction 
to negative news may depend on a country’s innovativeness. It has been argued that R&D 
expenditure creates intangible assets, such as patents and intellectual property (see, for 
example, Hall, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994; Al-Horani et al, 2003). According to Porter (1998), 
these intangible assets are considered to be among the most important sources of a nation’s 
competitive advantage. Knowledge management has also been regarded as one of key 
determinants of a country’s ability to exploit its own innovative efforts in order to improve its 
competitiveness in the global economy (Schwab, 2012). We argue that if investors can 
foresee the rewards from innovations, their confidence about the country’s ability to cope 
during difficult times will increase. Therefore, we expect stock indices of innovation-
intensive countries to be less adversely affected by the arrival of negative news about the 
global economy. This leads to: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Abnormal returns on the day of the informed negative shock are positively 
associated with a country’s investment in innovations. 
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The extant literature focuses on the riskiness of R&D investment relative to 
investments in physical assets. Chan et al (2001) argues that payoffs from R&D investments 
involve a larger degree of uncertainly and their benefits are likely to materialise much later 
than benefits from investments in physical assets. Consistent with this view, Al-Horani et al 
(2003) find a positive association between the cross-sectional UK expected returns and R&D 
expenditure. Their evidence implies that intangible assets resulting from R&D activities are 
riskier than tangible assets. The main objective of the study reported in this paper is not to 
compare the relative riskiness of tangible and intangible assets. Instead, we investigate the 
link between innovations and the change in stock market index betas following the arrival of 
major negative news. We argue that if innovations help firms to develop competitive 
advantage, highly innovative firms would be better for disruptive economic conditions and 
recessions should, therefore, have less adverse impact on their performance and the stability 
of their cash flows.  
 
The impact of negative news announcements on individual stock betas is widely 
examined in the literature. Several studies, including Hamada (1972), Appleyard and Strong 
(1989), Monkhouse (1997), show that the arrival of bad news tends to reduce equity value, 
increase firm leverage and increase stock betas. Others, such as Kalay and Lowenstein (1985) 
and Patell and Wolfson (1979), argue that surprises increase uncertainty and stock betas 
increase following negative news announcements. The uncertain information hypothesis 
(UIH) of Brown et al (1988) suggests that stock betas increase following both positive and 
negative news. The authors argue that in incomplete information environment, investors may 
use the parameters of a conditional probability distribution to estimate the various potential 
outcomes. Since the full extent and the ultimate impact of the arrival of good or bad news 
about a firm’s future prospects may still be uncertain, risk-averse investors may choose to 
apply high discount rates and set stock prices significantly below their conditional expected 
values.  
 
The concept of time varying betas is relevant to this study for two important reasons. 
First, failure to control for event-induced changes in beta may result in biased abnormal 
returns estimates. For instance, Benamraoui et al (2013) show that the price patterns 
following profit warning announcements disappear completely after adjusting for event-
induced systematic risk. Similarly, Mazouz and Saadouni (2009) find that the price effects of 
index revisions are sensitive to the time-varying risk adjustments. Specifically, they show that 
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OLS-based abnormal returns indicate that the price effect associated with the index revision 
is temporary, whereas market models with time varying betas imply that both additions and 
deletions experience permanent price change. Secondly, if innovation-intensive firms cope 
better during periods of economic distress, the arrival of negative news should have a less 
adverse impact on the riskiness and value of the stock market in countries that invested more 
in innovation, leading us to: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Beta changes following informed negative shocks are negatively associated 
with a country’s investment in innovation. 
 
3. The Financial Crisis in Europe  
 
The financial crisis began in the summer of 2007 due to the bursting of the US housing 
bubble. The sharp decline in US house prices caused the value of the securities backed by 
American real estate to collapse and interbank markets to freeze (Strahan, 2008; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This, in turn, caused widespread insolvencies among 
financial institutions in the US and globally. In 2008, the fourth largest US investment bank, 
Leman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy and the US government-sponsored enterprises Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship. During the same year, Northern 
Rock and the Bradford & Bingley Building Society were nationalised by the British 
government and the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg had to inject $9.2 
billion to Dexia, the world’s largest lender to municipalities. The Belgian, Dutch, and 
Luxembourg governments also injected $16.4 billion into banking and insurance company 
Fortis (Jackson, 2009). 
 
As investor confidence collapsed, financial distress transferred to business and 
household demand and the economy in Europe entered the steepest downturn on record since 
the 1930s. The European economy shrank by nearly 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in 
the EU's history (European Commission, 2009). This economic downturn triggered sovereign 
debt problems in Europe, making it almost impossible for some Eurozone countries, 
particularly Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (PIIGS), to service their debt 
obligations without the assistance of third parties, such as the European Central Bank (ECM) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The fears of sovereign debt crisis had severe 
economic and political consequences in both Europe and globally. The unemployment rate in 
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European also rose sharply, with Spain and Greece being the worst hit with unemployment 
rates exceeding 26% (Aridas and Ventura, 2011). In addition to the adverse economic effects, 
the European crisis saw major political shifts in the leading powers of the worst hit countries, 
including Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
 
The European countries adopted different policies to stimulate economic growth. 
Many central banks in Europe, including the ECB and the Bank of England cut interest rates 
(to 1.5% and 0.5%, respectively), approaching the Federal Reserve rate of 0.25%. In addition, 
the Bank of England has committed a total of £375 billion to quantitative easing since 2009 
(BBC, 2013). However, other European governments, particularly those that received funds 
from the EC, ECB and IMF, used budget tightening (that is, raising taxes and lowering 
expenditure) as a means to fight the crisis. Greece, for example, cut its healthcare spending 
by more than 40% and Portugal reduced the number of private sector workers covered by 
union contracts from 1.9 million to 300,000 (Weisbrot, 2014). This austerity policy also 
affected the R&D budget, with R&D expenditure dropping by a record of 4.5% in 2009 
across the OCED countries, except South Korea and France. 
 
The fears of contagion risk in Europe began to diminish by the second half of 2012 
following the successful policy measures taken by EU leaders and the ECB, which include 
fiscal consolidation and structural reforms among the worst affected countries. Whilst these 
actions helped to restore investors’ confidence in the Eurozone, some countries, particularly 
Greece and Cyprus, are still in need for funds from the ECB and IMF to restore recovery and 
stimulate growth.   
 
4. Data Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
For the crisis period, we analyse 27 European stock market indices2 over the period from 
January 2007 to December 2012.The stock market indices are from Datastream. The proxy 
for the World market portfolio is the Datastream World index. Yearly innovation measures 
and macroeconomic variables are obtained from the Eurostat and World Development 
Indicators, respectively. Informed negative shocks are identified by matching the lowest 5th 
percentile of the World Index returns during the study period with the timelines of crisis from 
                                                          
2
 The other European stock markets are excluded due to unavailability of the DS index data. 
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the BBC, ECB, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and The Guardian. To avoid confounding 
effects when tracking the post-shock abnormal returns, multiple price shocks in a 10-days 
post the event window are excluded from our analysis. By applying these criteria, we 
indentified 20 informed negative shocks over the study period, with a mean (median) of          
-4.54% (-4.51%) and values ranging from highest of -2.2% to the lowest of -6.65%.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We use government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a percentage of GDP 
(denoted GBOARD), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND), personnel 
and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total employment (EMPLOY) and patent 
applications per million inhabitants (PATENT) to capture different aspects of a country’s 
innovativeness. Specifically, GBAORD measures government’s support to R&D activities 
and the priority of public funding of R&D placed by central governments; RDEXPEND 
captures the governments’ R&D actual expenditure; EMPLOY is a measure of skilled 
workforce working in technological innovation; PATENT is a measure of innovation output.  
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the different innovation measures. We split 
the 27 European countries into high (30%), medium (40%) and low (30%) groups according 
to each of these four innovation measures and report the results in Panel A of Table 13.Panel 
B of Table 1 suggests the presence of wide discrepancies in the level of innovativeness across 
the sample countries. Specifically, the GBAORD averages 0.60%, with values varying from a 
minimum of 0.15% for Malta to a maximum of 1.16 % for Finland. Similarly, the 
RDEXPEND values range from 3.9% for Finland to 0.43% for Cyprus with a mean (median) 
of 1.60% (1.48%). Finland has the highest EMPLOY of 3.27%, while Romania has the 
lowest EMPLOY value of 0.42%. It also shows that the average PATENT is 104.95, with 
Switzerland and Russia having 429.82 and 1.49 patent applications per million inhabitants, 
respectively. Standard t-tests suggest that the variations in innovations across the three groups 
are significantly different from zero. 
 
                                                          
3
 To save space, each country’s group classifications in 2007 are illustrated in Panel A of Table 1. Yearly group 
classifications and more detailed descriptive statistics are available upon request.  
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After discussing innovation measures, we consider other potential determinants of the 
variations in cross-country stock returns. These variables include openness of goods trading, 
that is imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (TRADEOPEN), local inflation rate 
(INFLATION), official exchange rate to US$ (EXRATE), the size of financial intermediaries 
relative to the same of the whole economy, that is domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector as a percentage of GDP (Credit/GDP) and the size of the stock market relative to size 
of the whole economy, that is the market capitalisation of listed companies as percentage of 
GDP (MV/GDP). Our choice of these variables is guided by the findings of relevant studies 
in the literature. For example, Darrat and Zhong (2005) and Li et al (2004) show that trade 
openness increases co-movement across stock markets. Fama (1981) predicts a negative 
association between inflation and stock returns, as inflation is known to have an adverse 
effect on the real economy. Dornburch and Fisher (1980) argue that the currency movements 
affect international competitiveness and thus affecting the future cash flows of firms and their 
stock returns. Allen and Gale (2003) show that stock returns are positively related to the 
development of a country’s financial system, as a sufficiently liquid banking system allows 
stock market traders to smooth their trades and minimise price volatility. Finally, Martin and 
Rey (2000) argue that assets with larger demand have a higher price. They find that larger 
financial areas exhibit higher asset prices, implying a positive association between MV/GDP 
and stock returns.  
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and the correlations between the various variables 
used in our analysis. Panel A of Table 2 shows that TRADEOPEN has an average of 
107.65%, with values ranging from 47.97% for Turkey to 333.53% for Luxembourg. The 
average inflation rate during the crisis across 27 European countries is 3.8%. Ireland 
experienced a deflation of -3.18%, while Russia has the highest inflation rate of 17.96%. 
Norway (Cyprus) has the smallest (largest) Credit/GDP. Romania (Luxembourg) has the 
smallest (largest) MV/GDP. Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the 
variables used in our analysis. The correlations among the four innovation measures range 
from 0.61 between PATENT and GBAORD to 0.85 between PATENT and RDEXPEND. It 
indicates that governments’ R&D expenditures have a positive impact on patent applications. 
Thus, policy makers who are concerned with competitive success and wealth creation should 
encourage R&D investments by adopting effective policies, such as providing fiscal 
incentives, grants and subsidies of private R&D projects. INFLATION is also highly 
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correlated with CREDIT/GDP, with a correlation coefficient of -0.54. This finding is 
consistent with Boyd et al’s (2000) argument that an increase in inflation drives down the 
real rate of return and exacerbates credit market frictions. This, in turn, will have adverse 
effects on both financial intermediation and capital investments. The correlation between the 
remaining variables is relatively low (that is, less than 0.5 in absolute value) numerically, 
even though many of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5. Methodology 
 
This section describes the methods used to estimate abnormal returns and time varying betas 
around informed negative shocks. It also outlines the multiple regression models used to 
investigate the impact of investment in innovations on stock market reactions and its 
systematic risks.  
 
5.1 The BEKK-GARCH based event study 
 
It has been widely documented in the literature that stock betas vary considerably over time, 
as firms’ leverage, investment opportunities and other characteristics change (see, for 
example, Black, 1976 and Christie, 1982). Several studies, including Mandelbrot (1963) and 
Fama (1965), show that daily stock return series are heteroskedastic. The Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test suggests the presence of the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) effect in the residuals of the market model of all 27 stock market indices included in 
our analysis4. Following McKenzie et al (2000), we employ the cumulative sum of recursive 
residual squares (CUMSUMSQ) test to determine whether beta coefficients are constant or 
time varying. Our results show that the recursive residuals from CUMSUMSQ tests for all 27 
stock market indices fall outside the 5% bounds, indicating the parameters of the market 
model are time varying. Figure 1 provides a typical example of a graphical illustration of the 
CUMSUMSQ test results5. 
                                                          
4
 Further details on the LM test are available from the corresponding author on request. 
5
 Graphical illustrations of the CUMSUMSQ test of the remaining sample countries are also available upon 
request.  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The time varying nature of the beta coefficients and the presence of heteroskedasticity 
in the index returns impair the power of the traditional market model in an event study6. To 
overcome this problem, we use the bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK-
GARCH (1,1) model, which allows the market model betas to vary systematically over time 
and for the residual errors to be heteroskedastic. This model has also been used by Tsui and 
Yu (1999), Choudhry (2005) and Choudhry et al (2010), among others, to estimate abnormal 
returns. The conditional bivariate mean model is specified as  
 
                                                           ,             ,                                          (1) 
 
where       and      are random error terms. The conditional covariance matrix of the residual 
series allows the conditional variance and correlation of both country and World index 
returns to vary over time 
 
                                     ቀ   [       ]      ቁ     [                 ],                                  (2)                                
 
                                                                  ,                                             (3)   
 
where      is the information set of the past values of the error term   ;      is the 
conditional covariance between country index and World index returns;      and      are 
conditional variances of country index and World index returns, respectively.  ,   and   are 
2 x 2 matrices of parameters. Estimated values are indicated with a hat, for example  ̂  . The 
time-varying beta of index i,    , is defined in the usual way and is estimated by  
 
                ̂    ̂    ̂   ⁄ .                                                                  (4) 
 
                                                          
6
 Although the market model abnormal returns are generally higher than those of BEKK-GARCH (1, 1), our 
conclusions are not sensitive to the abnormal return estimation technique. More details of these results are 
available upon request. 
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To account for the potential effect of beta changes on the abnormal returns around informed 
negative shocks, beta adjusted abnormal returns,     , are estimated as  
  
                 ̂     ̂      .                                                      (5)                                                           
 
For N indices, the average beta adjusted abnormal returns and the cumulative beta adjusted 
abnormal returns are calculated in the usual way as 
  
        ̅̅ ̅̅     ∑               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     ∑           ,                                           (6) 
 
where       is the cumulative abnormal return of stock index i over a window of S days 
starting on the day of the event, that is       ∑           The two test statistics used to 
assess the statistical significance of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, are as follows 
 
                                           ⁄   ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂  ⁄          ⁄    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂   ⁄   ,                                 (7) 
 
where  ̂   and  ̂    are the estimated standard deviations of the ARi,t and CARi,s, 
respectively, and are estimated as 
 
               ̂   √     ∑          ̅̅ ̅̅          ,  ̂    √     ∑            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         .             (8) 
 
When standard assumptions hold, T1 and T2 follow Student t-distributions with N – 1 degrees 
of freedom.7  Following Benamraoui et al (2013), the impact of negative news 
announcements on country index betas is estimated using the following equation 
  ̂    ̂       ̂         ,                                                              (9) 
 
where  ̂      is index i’s estimated pre-event beta, measured over [-201,-1] window prior to 
the announcement date. The subscript          of      denotes the number of days after 
the event day t.     ,    , ...,    are dummy variables with a value of unity if         , 
                                                          
7
 For robustness purposes, we also use Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Consistent 
estimator and J-Statistic of Campbell et al (1997). The conclusions are unchanged.  
 
  
15 
 
        , ...,         , respectively, and zero otherwise.  ̂   is the estimated change in 
the beta measured over the window of length n after the event date. The standard paired t-test 
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test are used to test if the pre-event and post-
event betas are significantly different.  
 
5.2 Multiple regression analysis 
 
The following panel regression model is used to examine the relationship between 
investments in innovations and stock market reaction to the announcement of major bad news 
about the global economy  
 
                                                                       .                                           (10) 
 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate Equation (10) using the announcement day 
abnormal return      and then beta changes  ̂   as the dependent variables. Hypothesis 1 is 
tested by using      as the dependent variable in Equation (10). This hypothesis predicts that    will be positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 is tested by using    ̂ as the dependent variable. If this hypothesis holds, the parameter    will be negative and 
statistically significant. A specific innovation variable is denoted by IV and X represents the 
vector of control variables, namely TRADEOPEN, EXRATE, INFLATION, Credit/GDP and 
MV/GDP. All these variables are as previously defined (see Section 4) and their values are 
taken at the yearend prior to a given event. To avoid multi-collinearity related issues, the 
inclusion of highly correlated variables in the same regression model is avoided. 
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
The empirical results are presented in three subsections. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 are concerned 
with the crisis period from 2007. Section 6.1 discusses abnormal return estimates around 
informed negative shocks. Section 6.2 reports the changes in stock index betas following the 
announcements of negative news about the global economy. Section 6.3 presents the 
analogous results for the pre-crisis period 2001 to 2006. 
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6.1 Abnormal returns analysis 
 
Table 3 reports the event day average abnormal returns and the post-event cumulative 
abnormal returns for all 27 countries in the study and for the four subsamples of countries 
classified using the four different innovation measures described above. The event day 
abnormal return is negative (-0.08%), but is not statistically significant different from zero. 
The cumulative abnormal return over the windows [0, 10], [0, 20] and [0, 30] following 
informed negative shocks are also not significantly different from zero. This suggests that on 
average the national stock indices of the 27 European countries in the study were not 
vulnerable to the announcement of negative news about the global economy during the recent 
financial crisis.  
 
To test whether innovations affect stock market reactions to news about the global 
economy, we divided the 27countries into three groups, high (30%), medium (40%), and low 
(30%), based on each of the innovation measures described in Section 4. Table 3 shows that 
event day abnormal returns increase with innovation. The event day abnormal return for 
countries in the low innovation groups are negative and significantly less than zero8 for three 
out of the four measures. The cumulative abnormal returns over the windows [0, 10], [0, 20] 
and [0, 30] associated with this particular group of countries are also negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that such a negative reaction is long-lived. The significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal returns observed over the windows [1, 10], [1, 20] and [1, 30] imply the 
presence of price continuation patterns following the arrival of bad news about the global 
economy. This finding is consistent with Lasfer et al (2003), who show that large negative 
index price changes are followed by negative abnormal price performance. It should be noted, 
however, that there is some evidence in Panels A and C of Table 3 that the effect is 
weakening by day 30. 
 
Table 3 shows that the abnormal returns associated with the countries in the medium 
innovation groups are not significantly different from zero. However, countries in the highest 
innovation groups react positively to the arrival of negative news about the global economy. 
Specifically, the event day abnormal returns associated with countries with the 30% highest 
values of the classifiers GBAORD, RDEXPEND, EMPLOY and PATENT are 0.11%, 0.25%, 
                                                          
8
 To allow for the time difference between locations, we also estimate cumulative abnormal returns in the event 
window [0, 1]. The conclusions remain largely unchanged.  
  
17 
 
0.29% and 0.19%, respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns over longer event windows 
[0, 10], [0, 20] and [0, 30], are positive and, with a few exceptions, statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This evidence suggests that positive market reaction to negative news about the 
global economy is long-lived. We also find positive price continuation patterns in the indices 
of countries in the high innovation groups with positive abnormal returns on event days 
followed by positive price performance in the windows up to 20 days.  
 
Table 3 also provides the t-statistics for differences in cumulative abnormal returns 
between different innovation groups. Cumulative abnormal returns associated with countries 
in the high innovation groups are significantly higher than those in the low innovation groups. 
We also show that countries in the medium innovation groups tend to outperform those in the 
low innovation groups around the announcement of bad news about the global economy. 
These findings are robust to the different innovation measures. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We use multiple fixed effects panel data regressions, Equation (10), with abnormal 
return on the event day as the dependent variable to verify the validity of the results after 
accounting for the effect of other well known determinants of country level returns. 9 The 
Hausman test suggests that the use of fixed effects is more appropriate than a random effects 
specification for our data. Table 4 reports the coefficients of panel data regressions on the 
event day abnormal returns. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Consistent with the 
investors’ confidence view, the coefficients on the innovation measures in Models 1 through 
8 are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of MV/GDP, which measures the 
relative size of the financial market, is negative and statistically significant. This finding is 
similar to the small firm effect but contradicts Martin and Rey’s (2000) view that larger 
financial markets ought to exhibit higher asset prices. The remaining control variables are not 
significantly related the abnormal returns.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the index price reaction to negative shocks is positively 
associated with a country’s innovativeness. While the positive association between 
                                                          
9
 Our conclusions remain consistent when cumulative abnormal returns over longer windows post the informed 
negative shocks are used as the dependent variables in equation (10).  
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innovations and firm value is well documented in the literature (see Chan et al, 1990; Zantout 
and Tsetsekos, 1994; Eberhart et al, 2004, among others), this study is the first to show that 
stock markets in innovation-intensive markets react favourably to stressful economic 
circumstances. We argue that this evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1, which suggests 
investments in innovations enhances investors’ confidence in firms’ ability to compete 
effectively during difficult times. This finding is also consistent with several other studies in 
the literature, which suggest that innovations can create future opportunities to provide firms 
with distinct competitive advantage. Rhodes and Stelter (2009), among others, posit that 
turbulent times bring with them opportunities and threats. Hartman (2009) argues that 
innovations increase the flexibility and the speed at which firms respond to changing 
conditions. Several studies argue that firms adapt to economic downturns by implementing 
business strategies centred on innovations. For example, Clifford (1977) and Picard and 
Rimmer (1999) posit that firms tend to respond to recession conditions by developing new 
products and targeting new market niches. Chou and Chan (2002) argue that innovations 
enable firms to attract customers by improving their quality and brand or maintaining low 
prices in price-sensitive markets. Thus, the positive abnormal returns observed in the case of 
stock indices of innovation-intensive countries following the arrival of bad news about the 
global economic may reflect the distinct competitive advantage and ability of innovative-
intensive firms to adapt quickly and effectively to disruptive economic conditions. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
6.2  Changes in betas analyses 
 
Table 5 presents the changes in market index betas following informed negative shocks. 
Panel A shows that the average pre-event beta is 0.8185. The paired-test suggests that the 
pre- and post-event betas are not significantly different from each other, except for the 
window [0, 30] in which a significant beta decrease is observed after informed negative 
shocks.10 This finding implies that, on average, the arrival of bad news about the global 
economy does not affect the uncertainty and the index betas of our sample countries. 
                                                          
10
 Similar results are obtained when the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test is used to test the statistical 
significance of the beta changes.  
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To investigate the relationship between the index betas and investment in innovations, 
countries are divided into high (30%), medium (40%) and low (30%) groups based on each of 
our four innovation measures. Consistent with Jensen’s (1993) view that investment in 
innovations carries higher uncertainty, Table 5 shows that pre-event index betas increases 
with a country’s innovativeness. For example, the average pre-event beta associated with 
countries in the high, medium and low GBOARD groups are 0.9765, 0.8366 and 0.63, 
respectively. Similarly, the average pre-event betas for countries in the high, medium and low 
RDEXPEND groups are 0.9588, 0.8407 and 0.6477, respectively. Similar, although weaker, 
patterns are also observed when countries are split according to EMPLOY and PATENT. The 
differences in the pre-event index betas between countries in the high and low innovation 
groups are statistically significant, irrespective of innovation measures. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5 also compares the pre- and post-event betas associated with the different 
innovation groups. The results suggest that innovations are important determinants of the 
index betas reaction to the arrival of negative news about the global economy. We show that 
changes in index betas tend to exhibit a negative association with a country’s innovativeness. 
This relationship is particularly more pronounced in the cases of GBOARD and RDEXPEND 
and when post-event betas are measured over longer windows. For example, the average 
index betas of countries in the high GBOARD group exhibits a significant decline from 
0.9765 over the window [-201, -1] to 0.9212 over the window [0, 30]. However, the average 
index beta associated with countries in the medium and low GBOARD groups experience a 
consistent increase up to 20 days after the event. This increase is statistically significant in the 
case of countries in the medium GBOARD group for event windows [0, 5] and [0, 10]. 
Similar findings are reported when RDEXPEND is a proxy for innovation. Specifically, the 
group of countries with the highest RDEXPEND experience a consistent decline in index 
betas over a 30-day period after informed negative shocks. This decrease is significant for 
windows [0, 20] and [0, 30] following the event. Countries in the medium RDEXPEND 
group exhibit significant average beta increase for up to 20 days post-informed negative 
shocks. However, the average betas of countries in the low RDEXPEND also declines in the 
post-event periods, but the decrease is only significant for windows [0, 20] and [0, 30]. The 
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variations of betas across different groups are much less pronounced when EMPLOY and 
PATENT are used as proxies for innovation. 
 
We run multiple fixed effects panel data regressions (Equation 10 with  ̂   as the 
dependent variable) to investigate whether the results are robust after accounting for the 
effect of the control variables. The use of fixed effects regressions rather than random-effects 
are justified by Hausman tests. Table 6 reports the coefficients of panel data regressions on 
changes in betas for the window [0, 20] following the arrival of negative news about the 
global economy.11 The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Models 1 through 8 indicate the 
presence of negative association between index betas and innovation measures. However, this 
relationship is only statistically significant when GBOARD is used as a proxy for innovation. 
The coefficient on TRADEOPEN in Table 6 is positive and statistically significant, reflecting 
the fact that openness increases co-movements across stock markets (Li et al, 2004). The 
coefficient on INFLATION is also positive and statistically significant, implying that high 
inflation increases riskiness of firm’s capital investment and stock beta (Pindyck, 1984). 
Finally, the significantly negative association between index beta changes and CREDIT/GDP 
indicates that stock market systematic risk is lower in countries with more developed banking 
systems. The statistical significance of the remaining explanatory variables, namely MV/GDP 
and EXRATE, is sensitive to the model specification. Furthermore, when the estimated 
coefficients of these variables are significantly different from zero, it is only at the 5% level. 
 
The results of time varying beta analysis provide a partial support for Hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that the announcement of negative news has less negative impact on the 
riskiness of stock markets of the countries in the high innovation groups. The support is 
particularly more pronounced, when GBOARD is used as an innovation measure. While 
existing studies show that the arrival of negative surprises increases uncertainty and increase 
stock betas (see, for example, Brown et al, 1998; Kalay and Lowenstein, 1985; Patell and 
Wolfson, 1979), our results indicate that innovations may reduce uncertainty around negative 
surprises by enabling firms to exploit the opportunities and overcome the threats imposed by 
the global economic downturns. Thus, the reduced co-movement between stock indices of 
innovation-intensive countries and the World market portfolio may reflect the superior 
performance of highly innovative firms during crisis periods.  
                                                          
11
 The regressions are also run using betas for windows [0, 5], [0, 10], [0, 30] post the informed shocks. The 
results are consistent. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
6.3 The pre-crisis results 
Thus far, the results suggest that innovation helps to restore investors’ confidence and that 
stock indices of innovation-intensive countries react positively to the arrival of negative news 
during the financial crisis. To examine whether these results are unique to the crisis period, 
we investigate the stock market index reaction to the arrival of negative news prior the US 
subprime crisis that is from January 2001 to December 2006. In line with the earlier analysis, 
we use the bivariate BEKK GARCH-based event study methodology to estimate abnormal 
returns and time-varying betas. We also match the lowest 5th percentile of the DataStream 
World index returns with news announcements by the ECB to identify our events (that is, 
informed negative shocks). This matching resulted in 18 events over the pre-crisis period, 
with a mean (median) of -1.81% (-1.58%) and values ranging from -3.38% to -1.08%.  
Table 7 presents the post-event abnormal returns associated with the entire sample 
and the three subsamples of countries ranked on their innovation measures. Panel A shows 
that the average abnormal return associated with the 27 European indices on the event day is 
significantly negative. The cumulative abnormal returns are also significantly negative up to 
30 day following bad news announcements, implying that European stock indices underreact 
to the arrival of negative news. This finding is consistent with Lasfer et al (2003), who find 
that stock market indices underreact to both negative and positive shocks in the short-term.  
Table 7 also shows that the post-shock cumulative abnormal returns associated with high- 
and medium-innovation countries are not significantly different from zero. However, the 
cumulative abnormal returns of low-innovation countries remain negative and statistically 
significant up 30 days following the negative news announcements. This finding suggests 
innovation helps stock indices to absorb negative news more quickly. The stock indices of 
low innovation group exhibit larger price drops than those of high innovation group. The t-
statistics indicate that the presence of some differences in the reaction between high- and 
low-innovation countries, but the statistical significance of difference is not consistent across 
innovation measures and estimation windows. Specifically, the differences in the cumulative 
abnormal returns of high and low innovation groups are only significant in the cases of 
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GBAORD and REDEXPEND over the windows [0, 20] and [0, 30], respectively. We also 
estimate Equation (10) using data from the pre-crisis period. We find GBAORD is the only 
innovation measure that affects the index price reaction to negative news. The coefficient on 
GBAORD is positive and statistically significant, implying that stock indices of countries 
with high GBAORD exhibit lower negative reaction to negative news than those in the low 
GBAORD category. The details of these results are omitted from the paper to save space, but 
are available from the corresponding author on request. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
We also examine the link between innovation and the changes in the stock index betas 
following the arrival of negative news in the pre-crisis period. The results in Table 8 indicate 
that the average index beta of the sample countries increase significantly from 0.5889 over 
the window [-201, -1] to 0.6875 over the window [0, 30]. The post-shock index betas 
increase significantly for the high-, medium- and low-innovation groups. This finding is 
robust to different innovation measures and estimation windows. Contrary to the results from 
the crisis period, the t-statistics in Table 8 also suggest that the index betas of high innovation 
countries increase more than those in the low innovation category. We estimate the pre-crisis 
data using multiple fixed effect panel data regressions, Equation (10), with  ̂   over the 
window [0, 20] as the dependent variable. We find that GBAORD is the only innovation 
measure that affects index beta changes. Specifically, the coefficient on GBAORD is 
negative and significant, after controlling for the country fixed effect and other determinants 
of the beta changes. This finding implies that the index betas of high GBAORD countries are 
less adversely affected by the negative news announcement.  As above, these results are 
available on request. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
Overall, the pre-crisis data analysis provides some evidence that innovations may help 
to reduce the adverse effect of bad news announcement on the index prices and betas. 
However, the positive cumulative abnormal returns and the beta declines associated with 
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innovation-intensive country indices following negative news are unique to the times of crisis. 
This finding suggests that investors value innovation more during difficult times. 
   
7. Implications and conclusions 
 
The study uses country level data to test whether stock markets reward innovations. It 
contributes to the literature by linking innovations to investors’ confidence in a country’s 
ability to cope during times of economic and financial turmoil. We argue that if innovations 
enable firms and economies to develop distinct competitive advantage, which helps them to 
cope with difficult economic conditions and if investors can anticipate the rewards of 
innovations from a long-term prospective, the riskiness and value of stock market indices of 
highly innovative countries should be less vulnerable to the announcement of negative news 
about the global economy. We use the bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK 
model to investigate the price and beta reaction of the European stock market indices to 
arrival of major bad news during the recent global financial crisis.  
 
The results of this study suggest that the stock market reaction to the arrival of 
negative news about the global economy do depend on a country’s innovativeness. 
Specifically, we find that stocks in innovation-intensive economies offer higher returns and 
lower risk during crisis episodes. This evidence implies that innovation helps firms and 
economies to cope better during crisis. It also implies that assets in highly innovative 
economies offer investors opportunities to protect their wealth in crisis times. Further 
analysis suggests that the positive cumulative abnormal returns and the beta declines 
observed in the case of innovation-intensive country indices following negative news are 
unique to the crisis periods. This evidence suggests that investors value innovation more 
during difficult times.    
 
Our findings also have important implications for both managers and policy makers. 
The positive index price reaction of innovation-intensive countries to the negative global 
economic outlook suggests that investors reward innovation. In other words, while 
commitments to R&D expenditures may hurt current earnings, they are necessary for 
competitive success (or even survival) during economic downturns. Thus, managers who are 
seeking to maximise shareholder wealth should continue to invest in innovation without 
fearing short-term negative effects on the stock price. Furthermore, as innovations contribute 
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to economic stability, policy makers who are concerned with sustainable economic growth 
should encourage R&D investments by adopting effective polices, such as R&D tax credits 
and direct subsidies of private R&D projects. Governments should also avoid unnecessary 
cuts in R&D expenditures even during the crisis periods, as cutting R&D expenditure may 
have a significant negative impact on competitiveness the long-term. Becker and Pain (2008), 
for example, show that the poor performance of the UK manufacturing sector during the 
1990s was caused by the decline in UK government financing of R&D projects in the 
preceding periods.  
 
The evidence reported in this study opens several other paths for future research. For 
example, it may be useful to investigate the relationship between investments in innovation 
and stock market liquidity during crisis episodes. This analysis may shed some light on the 
extent to which investor perceive innovative economies as places for safety during global 
economic downturns. Other extensions could shift the focus from stocks to other asset classes. 
For instance, it can be argued that if innovations promote economic stability, default risk of 
bonds and borrowing costs should exhibit a negative association with a country’s 
innovativeness.    
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Innovation Measures 
 
Panel A: European countries included in the study and their group classifications in 2007 
Country 
GBAOR
D 
RDEXP
END 
EMPOL
Y  
PATEN
T Country 
GBAOR
D  
RDEXP
END  
EMPOL
Y  
PATEN
T 
Austria M H H H Malta L L L M 
Belgium M H H M Netherlands H M M H 
Bulgaria L L L L Norway M M H M 
Cyprus M L L L Poland L L L L 
Czech  M M M M Portugal H M L L 
Denmark H H H H Romania L L L L 
Finland H H H H Russia L M L L 
France M H M M Slovenia M M M M 
Germany H H M H Spain H M M M 
Greece L L M L Sweden H H H H 
Hungary L L M M Switzerland H H H H 
Ireland M M M M Turkey N/A L L L 
Italy M M M M UK M M M M 
Luxembourg L M H H 
     Panel B: Descriptive statistics for innovation measures during the crisis period  
  GBAORD (%) RDEXPEND (%) EMPOLY (%) PATENT 
Mean 0.60 1.60 1.64 104.95 
Median 0.64 1.48 1.52 73.63 
Min. 0.15 0.43 0.42 1.49 
Max. 1.16 3.90 3.27 429.82 
Std.Dev. 0.22 0.89 0.72 111.26 
Low  0.34 0.64 0.80 6.04 
Median 0.63 1.50 1.65 68.94 
High 0.86 2.79 2.56 251.59 
T-stat  (L/H) 18.02** 15.91** 18.47** 16.32** 
T-stat  (M/H) 8.25** 9.49** 10.42** 10.92** 
T-stat  (M/L) -10.57** -14.57** -12.75** -8.48** 
This table provides summary statistics for a sample of 27 European countries. Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and researchers in knowledge-
intensive activities to total employment (EMPLOY %), and patent applications per million inhabitants (PATENT) are country level 
innovation measures. The variables are measured as yearend values 1-year ahead of each of the 20 informed negative shocks during the 
crisis. The 27 European countries are split into high (30%), medium (40%) and low (30%) groups according to these four innovation 
measures. The standard t-test is used to test the differences in innovations across the three groups. **and * denote statistical significance at the 
1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables and Correlation Matrix during the 
Crisis Period 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  TRADEOPEN EXRATE INFLATION CREDIT/GDP MV/GDP  
Mean 107.65 10.03 3.80 130.33 79.28 
 Median 92.78 0.79 2.83 127.50 59.00 
 Min. 47.97 0.31 -3.18 24.00 10.00 
 Max. 333.53 207.94 17.96 316.00 324.00 
 Std.Dev. 56.84 35.15 3.56 62.72 65.34 
 Panel B: Correlation matrix   
  
GBAOR
D 
RDEXP
END 
EMPLO
Y 
PATEN
T 
MV/ 
GDP 
CREDIT/
GDP 
TRAD
EOPEN 
EXRA
TE 
INFLATIO
N 
GBAORD 1 
        RDEXPEND 0.72** 1 
       EMPLOY 0.62** 0.82** 1 
      PATENT 0.61** 0.85** 0.71** 1 
     MV/GDP 0.17** 0.30** 0.43** 0.52** 1 
    
CREDIT/GDP 0.31** 0.18** 0.37** 0.32** 0.34** 1 
   TRADEOPEN -0.28** -0.02 0.22** 0.10* 0.31** 0.17** 1 
  EXRATE -0.22** -0.14** -0.14** -0.18** -0.17** -0.24** 0.17** 1 
 INFLATION -0.41** -0.37** -0.44** -0.36** -0.07 -0.54** -0.17** 0.12** 1 
Panel A of Table 2 provides a summary statistics for the control variables, other than innovation measures, in equation (2). 
TRADEOPEN is measured by import plus export as a percentage of GDP; EXRATE is the US Dollar value of the local 
currency; INFLATION is the annual inflation rate; CREDIT/GDP is measured by domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector as a percentage of GDP; MV/GDP is measured by the market capitalization of listed companies as percentage of GDP. 
The variables are measured as yearend values 1-year ahead of 20 informed negative shocks during the crisis. Panel B 
presents the correlation matrix of these variables. **and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 Analysis of CARs around and following Informed Negative Shocks during the Crisis Period 
 
 
[0,0] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] [1,5] [1,10] [1,20] [1,30]   [0,0] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] [1,5] [1,10] [1,20] [1,30] 
Panel A: GBAORD 
 
Panel B: RDEXPEND 
Overall -0.08% -0.26% -0.05% -0.23% -0.43% -0.18% 0.03% -0.14% 
       t-stat -0.94 -0.91 -0.15 -0.54 -1.96 -0.64 0.09 -0.35 
         H 0.11% 1.73% 2.19% 2.29% 0.77% 1.62% 2.08% 2.18% 
 
0.25% 1.14% 1.57% 1.21% 0.30% 0.89% 1.32% 0.96% 
t-stat 1.00 5.19** 4.84** 3.87** 2.79** 5.02** 4.75** 3.79** 
 
2.08* 3.00** 3.23** 1.89 0.98 2.41* 2.80** 1.54 
M 0.08% -0.08% -0.12% -0.88% -0.44% -0.15% -0.20% -0.96% 
 
0.03% 0.83% 1.68% 1.42% 0.07% 0.80% 1.65% 1.39% 
t-stat 0.50 -0.17 -0.22 -1.26 -1.35 -0.37 -0.38 -1.42 
 
0.23 1.99* 3.39** 2.34* 0.22 1.95 3.40** 2.33** 
L -0.35% -2.31% -2.10% -1.93% -1.46% -1.96% -1.75% -1.58% 
 
-0.58% -3.17% -4.06% -3.93% -1.86% -2.59% -3.48% -3.35% 
t-stat -1.80 -3.56** -2.42* -2.10* -2.80** -3.04** -2.05* -1.73 
 
-3.09** -5.03** -4.95** -4.34** -3.77** -4.29** -4.29** -3.75** 
Diff (H/L) t-stats 2.06* 5.54** 4.39** 3.86** 3.78** 4.97** 3.98** 3.48** 
 
3.73** 5.86** 5.90** 4.64** 3.72** 4.91** 5.11** 3.96** 
Diff (H/M) t-stats 0.18 3.25** 3.25** 3.46** 2.83** 3.39** 3.33** 3.54** 
 
1.13 0.55 -0.15 -0.23 0.52 0.17 -0.47 -0.49 
Diff (M/L) t-stats 1.72 2.84** 1.93 0.91 1.67 2.36* 1.55 0.55 
 
2.57* 5.29** 5.99** 4.91** 3.27** 4.64** 5.42** 4.41** 
Panel C: EMPLOY   Panel D: PATENT 
H 0.29% 1.21% 1.62% 1.55% 0.09% 0.92% 1.33% 1.26% 
 
0.19% 1.04% 1.37% 1.27% 0.24% 0.85% 1.18% 1.08% 
t-stat 2.07* 2.94** 3.22** 2.44* 0.30 2.31* 2.71** 2.02* 
 
1.49 2.67** 2.78** 2.06* 0.80 2.28* 2.51* 1.80 
M 0.00% 0.37% 0.65% -0.03% 0.07% 0.38% 0.66% -0.02% 
 
0.08% 0.36% 0.70% 0.39% -0.02% 0.28% 0.62% 0.31% 
t-stat -0.03 0.91 1.40 -0.04 0.24 0.98 1.46 -0.04 
 
0.59 0.90 1.45 0.61 -0.07 0.73 1.31 0.50 
L -0.57% -2.60% -2.70% -2.28% -1.65% -2.03% -2.14% -1.72% 
 
-0.59% -2.42% -2.51% -2.57% -1.67% -1.83% -1.93% -1.98% 
t-stat -2.88** -4.05** -3.05** -2.40* -3.12** -3.21** -2.44** -1.83 
 
-2.91** -3.60** -2.84** -2.74** -3.12** -2.78** -2.21* -2.16* 
Diff (H/L) t-stat 3.54** 5.00** 4.24** 3.35** 2.86** 3.95** 3.46** 2.64** 
 
3.25** 4.46** 3.84** 3.42** 3.11** 3.55** 3.14** 2.79** 
Diff (H/M) t-stats 1.53 1.44 1.41 1.80 0.05 0.98 1.01 1.50 
 
0.60 1.22 0.98 1.00 0.63 1.07 0.85 0.90 
Diff (M/L) t-stats 2.38* 3.91** 3.35** 2.00 2.82** 3.25** 2.84** 1.53   2.75** 3.55** 3.19** 2.62* 2.69** 2.78** 2.57* 2.07 
This table reports average abnormal returns around and following the informed negative shocks by high/medium/low government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D 
as a percentage of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total 
employment (EMPLOYMENT %) and patent applications per million inhabitants (PATENT). The t-statistics calculated using Equation (7) are used to test whether the 
CARS are significantly from zero. The standard t-tests are employed to test the differences between groups. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Average Abnormal Returns on the Day of Informed Negative 
Shocks during the Crisis Period 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
GBAORD 0.010 
   
0.011 
   
 
(3.75) **  
   
(4.07) * 
   
RDEXPEND 0.003 
   
0.003 
  
  
(5.15) ** 
   
(4.88) ** 
  
EMPLOY 
  
0.004 
   
0.004 
 
   
(5.03) ** 
   
(4.73) ** 
 
PATENT 
   
0.002 
   
0.002 
    
(3.24) ** 
   
(3.24) ** 
EXRATE 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.56) (0.76) (0.75) (0.80) (0.67) (0.77) (0.76) (0.79) 
INFLATION -0.019 -0.035 -0.033 -0.035 
    
 
(-1.09) (-1.69) (-1.65) (-1.68) 
    
CREDIT/GDP 
   
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
     
(1.34) (1.15) (1.15) (1.42) 
TRADEOPEN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.80) (0.86) (1.04) (0.84) (0.82) (0.87) (1.25) (1.07) 
MV/GDP -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-3.17) ** (-2.87) ** (-3.00) ** (-2.43) * (-3.31) ** (-2.90) * (-3.04) ** (-2.49) * 
Constant -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.005 
 
(-1.59) (-1.69) (-2.40) * (-0.59) (-3.00) ** (-2.95) ** (-3.37) ** (-2.10) * 
Obs 520 540 540 540 520 540 540 540 
Adj R^2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 
This table shows the results of fixed effects panel regressions of the abnormal returns on the day of informed 
negative shocks for all the 27 European countries. Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel 
and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total employment (EMPLOYMENT %), and patent 
applications per million inhabitants (PATENT) are innovation measures. TRADEOPEN is measured by 
import plus export as a percentage of GDP; EXRATE is the US Dollar value of the local currency; 
INFLATION is the annual inflation rate; CREDIT/GDP is the domestic Credit provided by banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP. MV/GDP is the market Capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP.  The t-
statistics are shown in parentheses. **and* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Betas before/after Informed Negative Shocks during the Crisis Period 
 
 
Pre [0,0] [0,5] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] 
 
Pre [0,0] [0,5] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] 
 
Panel A: GBAORD 
 
Panel B: RDEXPEND 
Overall 
0.818
5 0.8334 0.8314 0.8309 0.8111 0.7960 
       t-stats (Pre/Post) -1.3881 -1.3266 -1.3362 0.8462 2.7508** 
       H 0.9765 0.9592 0.9550 0.9495 0.9326 0.9212 
 
0.9588 0.9493 0.9422 0.9370 0.9177 0.9033 
t-stats (Pre/Post) 1.2365 1.7060 2.2843* 3.9049** 4.9296** 
  
0.6868 1.3158 1.7961 3.5650** 4.8395** 
M 0.8366 0.8797 0.8710 0.8693 0.8482 0.8330 
 
0.8407 0.9084 0.9002 0.8980 0.8765 0.8604 
t-stats (Pre/Post) -2.5747* -2.2243* -2.1986* -0.7830 0.2500 
  
-3.5206** -3.3140** -3.3099** -2.2830* -1.3857 
L 0.6300 0.6613 0.6643 0.6655 0.6456 0.6297 
 
0.6477 0.6146 0.6261 0.6325 0.6147 0.6001 
t-stats (Pre/Post) -1.2721 -1.5252 -1.6609 -0.8205 0.0218 
  
1.6612 1.2671 0.9757 2.1501* 3.1723** 
Diff(H/L) t-stats 11.943** -1.7169 -2.1639* -2.5599** -2.6994** -2.7308** 
 
10.982** 0.9703 0.2344 -0.3328 -0.4260 -0.4186 
Diff(M/L) t-stats 6.242** 0.4359 0.0164 -0.1129 -0.1565 -0.1234 
 
6.124** 3.6004** 3.1883** 2.9881** 3.0595** 3.2267** 
Diff(H/M) t-stats 5.763** -2.723** -2.7328** -3.0310** -2.8877** -2.7296** 
 
4.546** -3.0659** -3.2378** -3.4699** -3.7006** -3.9169** 
Panel C: EMPLOY     Panel D: PATENT 
H 0.8906 0.9253 0.9195 0.9122 0.8928 0.8760 
 
0.8963 0.8987 0.8985 0.8979 0.8819 0.8674 
T-stats (Pre/Post) -2.3613* -2.1802* -1.7630 -0.1887 1.2772 
  
-0.1713 -0.1714 -0.1312 1.3035 2.6185** 
M 0.8802 0.8931 0.8826 0.8842 0.8669 0.8561 
 
0.8291 0.8651 0.8522 0.8461 0.8256 0.8159 
T-stats (Pre/Post) -0.8116 -0.1609 -0.2792 0.9634 1.7736 
  
-2.1261 -1.4917 -1.1608 0.2461 0.9445 
L 0.6614 0.6596 0.6730 0.6763 0.6529 0.6334 
 
0.7260 0.7247 0.7359 0.7429 0.7205 0.6972 
T-stats (Pre/Post) 0.0739 -0.5128 -0.6948 0.4490 1.6719 
  
0.0506 -0.4502 -0.8082 0.2949 1.7530 
Diff(H/L) t-stats 6.921** 1.2535 0.6606 0.2725 0.4820 0.6609 
 
5.738** 0.1281 -0.3081 -0.6402 -0.4141 -0.0063 
Diff(M/L) t-stats 7.322** 0.5450 -0.3427 -0.4437 -0.1973 0.2064 
 
3.268** 1.3212 0.5209 0.0014 0.0949 0.7438 
Diff(H/M) t-stats 0.392 0.9443 1.2765 0.9018 0.8038 0.4815 
 
2.202* -1.4942 -1.0185 -0.7760 -0.5759 -0.8546 
This table reports average index betas before/after the informed negative shocks by high/medium/low government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to 
total employment (EMPLOYMENT %) and patent applications per million inhabitants (PATENT). The paired t-tests are used to judge whether the pre-event beta 
is significantly different from the post-event betas. The standard t-tests are used to test the differences in pre-event betas and changes in betas across the three 
groups. **and* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Determinants of Changes in Beta [0, 20] post Informed Negative Shocks during 
the Crisis Period 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
GBAORD -0.107 
   
-0.108 
   
 
(-2.20) * 
   
(-2.27) * 
   
RDEXPEND 
 
-0.003 
   
-0.005 
  
  
(-0.15) 
   
(-0.33) 
  
EMPLOY 
  
-0.001 
   
-0.002 
 
   
(-0.05) 
   
(-0.09) 
 
PATENT 
   
-0.002 
   
-0.002 
    
(-0.16) 
   
(-0.16) 
EXRATE 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 
(1.82) (2.04) * (2.04) * (2.04) * (1.01) (1.17) (1.17) (1,16) 
CREDIT/GDP 
    
-0.104 -0.104 -0.104 -0.104 
     
(-6.10) ** (-6.57) ** (-6.62) ** (-6.59) ** 
INFLATION 1.524 1.406 1.407 1.406 
    
 
(3.72) ** (3.63) ** (3.66) ** (3.63) ** 
    
TRADEOPEN 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.054 
 
(3.60) ** (3.45) ** (3.47) ** (3.48) ** (3.92) ** (3.88) ** (3.88) ** (3.90) ** 
MV/GDP 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.029 0.035 0.035 0.035 
 
(0.18) (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (1.85) (2.24) * (2.24) * (2.22) * 
Constant -0.063 -0.126 -0.128 -0.128 0.104 0.042 0.037 0.036 
 
(-1.82) (-3.92) ** (-3.54) ** (-5.52) ** (2.70) * (1.12) (0.83) (1.13) 
Obs 520 540 540 540 520 540 540 540 
Adj R^2 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 
This table shows the results of fixed effects panel regressions of the Beta changes for [0, 20] post the informed 
negative shocks for all the 27 European countries. Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and 
researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total employment (EMPLOYMENT %), and patent applications 
per million inhabitants (PATENT) are innovation measures. TRADEOPEN is measured by import plus export 
as a percentage of GDP; EXRATE is the US Dollar value of the local currency; INFLATION is the annual 
inflation rate; CREDIT/GDP is the domestic Credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP. 
MV/GDP is the market Capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP. The t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. **and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Analysis of CARs around and following Informed Negative Shocks during the Pre-Crisis Period 
 
This table reports average abnormal returns around and following the informed negative shocks by high/medium/low government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total employment (EMPLOYMENT %) 
and patent applications per million inhabitants (PATENT) during the period of Jan 2001 to Dec 2006. The t-statistics calculated using Equation (7) are used to test whether the CARS are 
significantly from zero. The standard t-tests are employed to test the differences between groups. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
 
[0,0] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] [1,5] [1,10] [1,20] [1,30] 
 
[0,0] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] [1,5] [1,10] [1,20] [1,30] 
Panel A: GBAORD 
 
Panel B: RDEXPEND 
Overall -0.15% -0.93% -0.82% -0.53% -0.54% -0.78% -0.67% -0.38%  
      t-stat -2.34* -4.53** -3.24** -1.77 -3.64** -4.02** -2.73** -1.29  
       
 
H -0.13% -0.59% -0.20% 0.08% -0.15% -0.46% -0.07% 0.21% 
 
-0.14% -0.87% -0.53% -0.24% -0.35% -0.73% -0.39% -0.10% 
stat -1.28 -1.97** -0.54 0.19 -0.66 -1.53 -0.18 0.51 
 
-1.48 -3.01** -1.39 -0.57 -1.65 -2.55* -1.07 -0.24 
M -0.11% -0.77% -0.63% -0.46% -0.53% -0.66% -0.51% -0.34% 
 
-0.25% -0.82% -0.78% -0.55% -0.68% -0.57% -0.54% -0.31% 
t-stat -1.42 -2.67** -1.70* -1.09 -2.31* -2.37* -1.41 -0.85 
 
-2.69** -2.85** -2.23** -1.41 -3.07** -2.14* -1.58 -0.80 
L -0.22% -1.43% -1.62% -1.18% -0.90% -1.21% -1.40% -0.96% 
 
0.10% -1.14% -1.68% -1.93% -0.89% -1.25% -1.79% -2.03% 
t-stat -1.42 -3.09** -2.93** -1.67 -2.97** -2.87** -2.68** -1.40 
 
0.61 -2.38* -2.87** -2.71** -2.55* -2.88** -3.29** -2.88** 
Diff (H/L) t-stats 0.47 1.52 2.14* 1.54 1.96 1.45 2.10* 1.46 
 
-1.26 0.49 1.66 2.05* 1.32 1.00 2.14* 2.37* 
Diff (H/M) t-stats -0.15 0.43 0.82 0.91 1.17 0.49 0.87 0.96 
 
0.81 -0.12 0.49 0.55 1.06 -0.40 0.30 0.37 
Diff (M/L) t-stats 0.61 1.20 1.50 0.88 0.96 1.09 1.40 0.78 
 
-1.82 0.58 1.32 1.69 0.52 1.33 1.95 2.15** 
Panel C: EMPLOY 
 
Panel D: PATENT 
H -0.11% -0.84% -0.41% -0.11% -0.31% -0.74% -0.31% -0.01% 
 
-0.22% -0.97% -0.71% -0.53% -0.45% -0.75% -0.49% -0.30% 
t-stat -0.94 -2.41* -0.89 -0.21 -1.21 -2.13* -0.70 -0.01 
 
-2.49* -3.34** -1.82 -1.27 -2.23* -2.65 -1.30 -0.76 
M -0.21% -0.71% -0.88% -0.69% -0.60% -0.51% -0.68% -0.49% 
 
-0.14% -0.58% -0.27% -0.04% -0.21% -0.43% -0.12% 0.10% 
t-stat -2.08* -2.33* -2.37* -1.63 -2.51* -1.77 -1.85 -1.17 
 
-1.98* -2.33* -0.89 -0.12 -1.20 -1.87 -0.43 0.29 
L -0.03% -0.91% -1.11% -0.80% -0.77% -0.88% -1.08% -0.77% 
 
0.05% -1.18% -1.83% -1.96% -1.27% -1.23% -1.88% -2.01% 
t-stat -0.20 -2.01* -2.07* -1.16 -2.41* -2.10* -2.13* -1.14 
 
0.32 -2.63** -3.36** -3.05** -3.78** -3.02** -3.67** -3.16** 
Diff (H/L) t-stat -0.40 0.11 0.98 0.79 1.11 0.26 1.14 0.90 
 
-1.49 0.39 1.67 1.87 2.07* 0.97 2.19* 2.27* 
Diff (H/M) t-stats 0.67 -0.28 0.78 0.85 0.80 -0.51 0.64 0.73 
 
-0.69 -1.03 -0.91 -0.88 -0.90 -0.87 -0.78 -0.76 
Diff (M/L) t-stats -0.98 0.36 0.34 0.14 0.44 0.73 0.64 0.36 
 
-1.11 1.18 2.52* 2.61** 2.78** 1.70 3.01** 2.91** 
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Table 8 Betas before/after Informed Negative Shocks during the Pre-Crisis Period 
 
 
Pre [0,0] [0,5] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] 
 
Pre [0,0] [0,5] [0,10] [0,20] [0,30] 
 
Panel A: GBAORD 
 
Panel B: RDEXPEND 
Overall 0.5889 0.7301 0.7380 0.7251 0.7025 0.6875 
      t-stats (Pre/Post) 25.8193** 26.6330** 27.0297** 27.8039** 28.2001** 
 
 
     H 0.9218 1.1289 1.1400 1.1277 1.1001 1.0773  0.8253 0.9882 0.9972 0.9922 0.9714 0.9547
t-stats (Pre/Post) 33.8905** 33.0672** 33.6097** 32.8495** 31.8287** 
 
 27.2946** 26.9474** 27.5287** 26.5944** 26.1660** 
M 0.5938 0.7326 0.7467 0.7345 0.7102 0.6996  0.6098 0.7821 0.7911 0.7706 0.7344 0.7126 
t-stats (Pre/Post) 23.4896** 24.4624** 24.3525** 24.7802** 25.3642** 
 
 19.5467** 20.9053** 21.3612** 22.3224** 22.9110** 
L 0.2820 0.3665 0.3636 0.3492 0.3336 0.3198  0.3777 0.3928 0.3933 0.3768 0.3623 0.3636 
t-stats (Pre/Post) 6.2582** 6.6119** 6.8427** 7.4672** 7.8111** 
 
 8.1319** 8.3030** 8.3361** 8.8671** 9.3208** 
Diff(H/L) t-stats      19.6145** 2.2726* 2.6709** 2.9404** 3.0282** 3.0189**  11.5588** 3.3147** 3.5513** 3.9855** 4.0525** 3.7405** 
Diff(M/L) t-stats       9.3695** 1.0517 1.4995 1.6726 1.7185 2.0152*  6.4170** 3.2812** 3.6669** 3.7838** 3.6969** 3.3450** 
Diff(H/M) t-stats     12.9671** 1.6404 1.5494 1.5971 1.6005 1.3412  6.9288** -0.2160 -0.2219 0.1503 0.5721 0.7487 
Panel C: EMPLOY     Panel D: PATENT 
H 0.8030 0.9681 0.9735 0.9614 0.9246 0.8982 
 
0.7393 0.8977 0.9015 0.8950 0.8701 0.8526 
T-stats (Pre/Post) 23.9103** 23.2709** 23.3640** 22.6676** 21.9213** 
  
23.5839** 23.3809** 23.5977** 22.6823** 22.1631** 
M 0.6271 0.7288 0.7468 0.7357 0.7154 0.7000 
 
0.5611 0.7115 0.7430 0.7302 0.6990 0.6818 
T-stats (Pre/Post) 21.0006** 21.9978** 22.2361** 22.7029** 23.1545** 
  
20.5282** 21.1455** 21.0420** 20.6641** 20.4278** 
L 0.2910 0.3535 0.3490 0.3316 0.3182 0.3184 
 
0.4668 0.5221 0.5080 0.4854 0.4671 0.4642 
T-stats (Pre/Post) 5.7749** 6.0694** 6.1831** 6.7525** 7.2812** 
  
10.0341** 10.4169** 10.5746** 11.5828** 12.4998** 
Diff(H/L) t-stats    12.3357** 1.8944* 2.2087* 2.5012* 2.2811* 1.7764 
 
7.2022** 2.1007* 2.6448** 3.1716** 3.3256** 3.1825** 
Diff(M/L) t-stats     9.0435** 0.7378 1.2620 1.5111 1.5825 1.3134 
 
2.6002** 2.0230* 3.1872** 3.6032** 3.7194** 3.6327** 
Diff(H/M) t-stats     4.9930** 1.4960 1.1903 1.2079 0.8649 0.6140 
 
4.9203** 0.2324 -0.5715 -0.4031 -0.2266 -0.2402 
This table reports average index betas before/after the informed negative shocks by high/medium/low government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP (GBOARD %), R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (RDEXPEND %), personnel and researchers in knowledge-intensive activities to total employment 
(EMPLOYMENT %) and patent applications per million inhabitants (PATENT) during the period of Jan 2001 to Dec 2006. The paired t-tests are used to judge whether the 
pre-event beta is significantly different from the post-event betas. The standard t-tests are used to test the differences in pre-event betas and changes in betas across the three 
groups. **and* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Example of a CUMSUMSQ Test for Parameter Stability 
 
 
 
The results of the CUMSUMSQ test indicates that the parameters generated from regressing Austrian 
stock market index returns against World index returns are not stable over time.  
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